The doctrine of physicalism is a widely discussed philosophical question in which the mind-body problem is extensively explored. This controversial topic has led philosophers to question the relationship between mind and matter and, more specifically, between consciousness and the brain. There are a number of arguments to support both sides, but two that are quite compelling are What is it like to be a bat? and What Mary Didn't Know About Jackson. These two objections to physicalism use the subjective aspect of experience to suggest that the mind exists as something separate from the brain. While both of these objections constitute challenges to physicalism, Nagel's argument poses a greater threat due to its specific use of bats rather than humans. In this article I will discuss how Nagel's objection is more harmful to the doctrine of physicalism than Jackson's. Objections to Physicalism To discuss how Nagel's argument is a better refutation of physicalism than Jackson's, I need to outline both. Nagel's argument explains that we can never know what it is like to be a bat because of something he calls the subjective character of experience. This means that something can only be conscious if there is something it means to be that thing, in other words, it has an individual perspective towards its experiences. Nagel states that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat because since they have consciousness, we cannot know what the subjective character of their experiences is, since they cannot be reduced to the physical state alone. The same basic conclusion follows from Jackson's Mary case. Jackson uses the example of Mary, who has never seen color before, lives in a black and white room and studies the ne... middle of the paper... red color because it's a simulated version of that, it was still reduced to a physical state of the brain and instilled in Mary's head, bringing her closer to understanding the experience. With Nagel's example, there is no possible way to instill the brain state of a bat into the head of a human, as our neurophysiologies differ greatly. Therefore, Nagel's argument is stronger because it cannot be reduced to as close to physicalism as Jackson can. By combining Jackson's case of Mary with Nagel's example and comparing the two, it is revealed that Jackson's case shows a closer connection between seeing the color red and can be further reduced to physicalism than Jackson's example. Nagel, simply because Nagel uses bats instead of humans. Jackson's case is slightly contradictory and does not refute physicalism as effectively as Nagel does.