IndexEthnic IdentityTerritorySolutionsCase Study: RwandaConclusionBibliographyWars have distinct ways of erupting and intensifying. In many cases wars are expected and expected, while in others they seem rather sudden and unexpected. Before the 1990s, the world witnessed more wars based on ideological positions than ethnic conflicts. However, since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed an increasing number of wars based on identity or ethnic affiliation and belonging. While wars over ideological differences may be easier to resolve, identity-based wars or ethnic civil wars are considered entrenched and extremely difficult to pacify. Simply put, ideologies are susceptible to change and each group can be accommodated and appeased. However, in ethnic civil wars this is not the case. Therefore, such conflicts often become unpredictable and very difficult to resolve. Therefore, the international community has not yet been fully able to find adequate ways to resolve these ethnic conflicts. Ethnic civil wars are very unique in their nature. The reasons for their outbreak, the conduct of wars and their possibility of resolution have very different dynamics compared to traditional wars. Taking the Rwandan genocide as a case study, it may be evident that such a war, while once again being another war, can be very different from cross-border wars. The peculiar nature of ethnic civil wars is very intriguing. This then leads to the question: what is the nature of ethnic civil wars and what are the possible solutions to solve the problem? How did Rwanda “solve” its ethnic problems and how effective was the solution? Ethnic civil wars are different in nature and more difficult to resolve than traditional wars because ethnicities cannot be changed and are often tied to personal identity. Furthermore, the conflict concerns an already shared piece of land for which all parties are fighting. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original EssayThe many entanglements of ethnic civil wars make them very interesting to study. In this article I will first discuss, from a theoretical perspective, the nature of civil wars, why and how they occur, as well as the factors that make them exceptionally difficult conflicts to resolve. Furthermore, I will discuss the literature found on possible solutions to resolve ethnic conflicts. To apply the theory to a real-life example, I will use Rwanda as a case study and discuss the outbreak of the conflict and how the ethnic war was resolved in Rwanda. Finally, I will evaluate how effective Rwanda's solution to the conflict was. Ethnic Identity Ethnic civil wars represent one of the most difficult conflicts to resolve due to the entrenched identity of each side. While in traditional wars people can take one side or the other and are often susceptible to changing sides, in ethnic wars people fight for their identity and who they are. Scholars define ethnicity as "intrinsic characteristics of individuals or groups that are not subject to change and can be a direct cause of conflict." Scholars of new warfare argue that ethnically fractured societies are more prone to the outbreak of ethnic civil wars at any time due to “ancient hatreds” between ethnic groups. Kaufmann argues in his article on ethnic civil wars that the loyalties of individuals are “rather rigid” in ethnic civil warsand the people involved can never change their position. He also states that war deepens and strengthens ethnic identities (Kaufmann, 1996). This intensifies the likelihood of widespread violence and lengthens the duration of the war itself. The reason ethnic wars escalate rapidly is because locals know which people belong to which ethnic groups, where they live, and how they dress and speak. Settlements of mixed populations can intensify violence and motivate ethnic cleansing. Thus, it becomes easier to create attacks and fuel more aggressive hatred. Since such wars are based on identity, it is difficult to mobilize more people than actually belong to this ethnicity. However, group mobilization is easy because the entire ethnic group is at stake in ethnic cleansing or land conquest. And even those who place little value on their ethnic identity are driven towards ethnic mobilization (Kaufmann, 1996). Often the pressure can be penalizing and impose sanctions on those who do not contribute to the war with their own ethnic group. For each ethnic group the use of violence against the other is justifiable because there is always the fear of ethnic cleansing. And so, the idea is that the group that erases the other one first wins. The atrocities of war make political understanding or negotiations impossible. Therefore, ethnic identities make ethnic cooperation largely unattainable. Territory Another factor that makes ethnic conflicts exceptional is that the war is fought for the consolidation of power over a certain piece of land. The struggle for territory creates a security dilemma in itself, where the absence of security during war pushes ethnic groups to be more violent towards each other, thus increasing the threats of insecurity for both. However, most ethnic groups would forgo immediate security for the delayed gratification of territorial acquisition. Territorial acquisition is not only a sign of victory, but also the securitization of identity, as well as a symbol of their physical survival. “For ethnic groups, territory is invariably linked to the identity of the group.” As a result, “homeland” is a vital aspect of group security and there is always fear of the “other” who shares the same home. However, the clash occurs when both groups realize that to ensure their survival they must acquire the same piece of land. For this reason, the violence is often always extreme because both groups would claim ownership of the land and the right to protect it. In ethnic wars, mobilization is easy since the goal is not an abstract idea, but to claim control over a territory where people already live and belong. Therefore, to ensure its survival, an ethnic group will seek to control the territories in which it is geographically concentrated. However, violence can be exacerbated in societies where there are settlements of mixed populations due to offensive opportunities. The proximity between enemies can lead both groups to always be on the offensive to discourage the other side (Weidmann, 2009). Therefore, intermingled societies may face harsher atrocities during ethnic conflicts, and proximity may increase the chances of ethnic cleansing. As noted by Weidmann, fragmented ethnic groups are often less likely to be violent than those clustered together. However, the onset of war changes the geographic settlements of ethnic groups. Those who can afford to move will move closer to a group of their own ethnic group as this represents greater safety. This notion further explains why theEthnic wars increase violence as they drag on. The more geographically concentrated ethnic groups are, the more offensive they can be (Melander, 2009). Therefore, ethnic conflicts become extremely difficult to resolve due to the geographical proximity of enemies and the reluctance of both sides to cooperate. Solutions Although ethnic civil wars present a very complicated situation, many scholars have attempted to propose solutions to prevent conflict or ethnic cleansing. In many cases the proposed solutions seem rather simplistic, while in others they seem possible. Although in many cases the conflict seems rather unsolvable, some solutions are still considered viable. The literature found proposes that there are many ways in which ethnic conflicts could end. The most simplistic of which is negotiating agreements. This solution, although very noble, seems rather impractical when each group is busy obliterating the other. Negotiating as a solution can be useful at the beginning of the conflict before it turns into a full-blown war. Weiberg-Salzmann also argues that groups involved in an ethnic conflict are less likely to allow peace talks to be negotiated because the demilitarization that follows the negotiations poses a threat to each respective group. Kaufmann proposed in his article that if peaceful negotiations do not work at the local level, peace enforcement could be enforced by a third party; the UN suggested. Kaufmann argued that conflict suppression could be achieved through sanctions, military aid, or direct military intervention (Kaufmann, 1996). Other scholars suggest that a better possible solution would be a partition. According to scholars who support partition, they argue that it decreases the risk of remilitarization and provides a more stable security situation for both sides. Kaufmann in his article, argued for the demographic separation of ethnic groups as it “reduces both incentives and opportunities for further fighting.” While demographic separation rightly reduces the possibility of future wars, it seems a little too utopian. When it comes to real application, this solution faces some difficulties. First, this solution encourages the fragmentation of states. Furthermore, in societies with mixed populations, group relocation can be difficult and can result in many casualties. Furthermore, not everyone would like to move. Those who have a strong commitment to where they live may be reluctant to move. Furthermore, conflict could resume over which group will take which part of the territory and where the borders should be drawn. As a result, this solution, although it seems very promising in reducing warfare, may prove difficult in practice. Another solution to end the power struggle in ethnic civil wars could be power sharing. Power sharing, according to scholars, is an attractive solution when partition is not optional. For power sharing to work, as stated by Kaufmann, there needs to be a joint exercise of government power, proportional distribution of government funds, and substantial autonomy on ethnic issues, as well as minority veto power. In essence, for power sharing to work, both sides must actively choose to cooperate and commit to avoiding ethnic conflict. Similarly, other scholars agree that power sharing is a viable solution that benefits all parties involved. “Power-sharing institutions promote a sense of securityamong former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-imposing peace." Hartzell and Hoddie also added that power sharing promotes positive political interactions. In essence, power sharing limits the chances of one group monopolizing power and dominating the other. Case Study: RwandaRwanda represents a crucial case study when studying ethnic civil wars. With excessive conflict and growing hatred between Tutsi and Hutu, one can begin to understand the complexity of ethnic civil wars. The wealthy Tutsi minority took power over the Rwandan kingdom for a long time. In 1933, the Belgians took over Rwanda and introduced ethnic identity cards and made sure that most of the jobs and education went to the Tutsis (Kuhlman, 2016). In 1959 there was a Hutu revolution that ousted the Belgians and the monarchy. In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgium and the Hutus came to power and began killing Tutsis, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to leave the country. In 1990, Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed an armed rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and returned to Rwanda to wage war on the Hutu army. There have been efforts by organizations and states to bring peace to Rwanda by proposing the Arusha Accords. The agreement called for a ceasefire, disarmament and a power-sharing transitional government. Peace efforts looked promising until, in April 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by Tutsi rebels. Hundreds of days of genocide had begun from that incident. In just one hundred days, an estimated 800,000 to 100,000 people were killed, and the international community was unable to stop the genocide. The killing was so brutal that “the world's largest peacekeeping force was unable to end the fighting (“Rwanda Genocide,” 2014). The war ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front captured the territory and the government collapsed. Peace talks had broken down during the genocide and the mission was to bring both sides back to the negotiating table to conclude the peace agreement previously signed in 1993. In September 1994, a power-sharing government was formed. After taking control of Rwanda, the RPF installed an “expanded transitional government” that was claimed to conform to the Arusha Accords. The new transitional government, however, made the extremist Hutu party illegal and therefore not part of the power-sharing agreement. However, the new government included other parties, but they were politically weak. The power-sharing government operated with equal representation until 2003, when the RPF won 40 seats in elections. This event puts the case of Rwanda to the test; Was the Rwandan case a failure? For multiple reasons the Arusha peace agreements did not produce the expected results. First, the agreement called for disarmament and a ceasefire, but many people refused to disarm for fear of potential future conflict. Other than equal representation that ended in 2003, when the RPF won 40 seats in the national assembly, constitutional reform has not achieved its goals. According to the matrix of the peace agreements, in 2002 the constitutional reform was limited to classifying it as “intermediate implementation”. However, the government encouraged women's participation in politics. Furthermore, inter-ethnic state relations have improved, but have not reached their full goal. After the genocide, the government eliminated all ethnic references from official documents. At the same time, some government policies continued to promote ethnic identification. However, laws prohibiting identification/20684601