In “A New Look at the Prime Mover,” Bradshaw argues that Aristotle's immobile, immaterial, necessary mover is not only a final cause but also an efficient cause. He proposes to demonstrate this by applying a particular interpretation of divine thought as the key to understanding Aristotle's seemingly vague comments regarding the causal role of the prime mover. This article will respond to some of Bradshaw's objections to the standard view of prime mover as final cause. Based on a passage linking prime mover activity and motion, Bradshaw presents his first objection to the standard view by arguing that it demonstrates efficient prime mover causation. The link between the activity of the prime mover and motion can be explained by Metaphysics 1072b1-3 in which the prime mover moves the first sky as an object of desire. In the first part of his fourth objection, Bradshaw interprets the words “infinite power” as efficient causation. However, the point of the argument is to demonstrate the prime mover's lack of greatness and not its power. Furthermore, terminology such as power implies power that is not within the main engine. Bradshaw's last objection to evaluate, the second part of the fourth objection, is that the army analogy points to efficient causation. Bradshaw is wrong here because he takes the analogy beyond Aristotle's intention which is to demonstrate the goodness relationship between the prime mover and the world and not to say that the prime mover is the organizing principle of the world. We say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Bradshaw's first set of objections to the standard reading of the prime mover as a final and inefficient cause is that, first, Aristotle does not specify that the prime mover is not an efficient cause (as is the unmoved mover in Physics), and secondly certain passages seem to indicate an efficient rather than final causality. In response to the first problem, Bradshaw admits that there are quite a few cases in which Aristotle changes his views without comment. He writes that, despite this, the language of Metaphysics XII.6 is “most naturally interpreted as referring to an efficient cause.” To support this claim, Bradshaw refers to 1071b17. “Because if it is not active, there will be no movement.” Bradshaw explains that this passage is part of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonists' lack of an explanation for the source of motion. Bradshaw takes the “it” as indicative of the prime mover and reads the necessity of prime mover activity for motion as indicative of efficient causation. If the Prime Mover were not active, in other words, if the Prime Mover were not active (because the Prime Mover is its activity), then there would be no movement, particularly of the first heaven. However, Aristotle carefully explains how the first mover moves the first heaven. That by which it can exist among immovable things is made clear by a distinction. For this in view of this is both for him for whom and for that towards whom, and of the latter the latter is immobile and the former is not. And it produces movement as it is loved, and moving something in this way moves the rest. In this passage Aristotle explains that the "in view of which", simply the final cause, can be distinguished in two ways. The first, “he for whom,” seems to indicate someone who can inspire another to do something for themselves. This final cause is mobile, which implies the ability to change and therefore is not necessary, at least as far as space is concerned. The second, a "that towards which", is more similar to a magnet that attracts another body towards itself by its nature. The kibble attracts adog in this way being eager for what it is and what the dog is. Aristotle concludes that this is how the first mover moves to the first heaven. “This, then, is the kind of starting point on which the sky and nature depend.” Consequently, the passage cited by Bradshaw does not clearly indicate or lend itself naturally to efficient causation any more than it does to reading it as final cause. Indeed, Aristotle clearly explains how the prime mover as the final cause moves the first heaven. The first part of Bradshaw's fourth objection is that Aristotle's argument regarding the infinite power of the prime mover requires that it be an efficient cause. “Because the Engine possesses infinite power, it cannot have greatness. This clearly requires the Mover to be an efficient cause, since a final cause need not possess any power.” The argument Bradshaw refers to comes at the end of Metaphysics XII.7 and focuses on the question of the size of the prime mover. It has also been shown that this substance cannot have any size, but must be without parts and indivisible. For it moves something for an unlimited time, and nothing finite has unlimited capacity. And, since all greatness is unlimited or finite, it cannot have finite greatness... and it cannot have unlimited greatness because there is no unlimited greatness at all. The main purpose of this argument is to demonstrate that the prime mover lacks greatness and not that. the prime mover has “infinite power” or “unlimited capacity.” Aristotle's argument is not that the prime mover moves the prime heaven and therefore must have unlimited capacity. Rather, nothing finite has unlimited capacity and the prime mover, because it eternally moves the prime heaven, cannot be finite. Of course, this step implies that the prime mover has unlimited capacity. One must be cautious due to the implications of power within the word “capacity” since it is evident that the prime mover, being pure reality, has no power in itself. Bradshaw recognizes a serious difficulty in using this passage. He does not mean to argue that the Prime Mover is “an efficient cause in a simpler and more ordinary sense… since it implies that the Mover exerts a power that can be quantified and is comparable to (though far greater than) that exercised by physical bodies. ”. He goes on to say that if one were to take this to its extreme logical conclusion, one would deduce that the prime mover exerts some sort of physical force on the prime heaven. He rejects this conclusion because of its clear inconsistency with the rest of Aristotle's account of the prime mover. Although Bradshaw rejects such a physical conception of prime mover causality, this points to a problem that could be avoided if one regarded the argument as relating to the prime mover's lack of magnitude and not as implying that the prime mover moves in a certain way (as an efficient agent) different from what Aristotle explains in the Metaphysics. The second part of the fourth objection is an argument for efficient prime mover causation based on the analogy of an army. This argument fails because Bradshaw believes the analogy means more than the author intended. Bradshaw states that “the Mover acts directly and intentionally upon the cosmos to produce order, just as a general act upon his army.” He draws this conclusion based on Aristotle's inclusion of the analogous relationship between a general and his army and between the prime mover and the prime heaven. We must also investigate how the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best, whether as something separate and intrinsic or as its organization. Or rather in both directions, like an army? Because the good of an army lies in its organization, and it is 14, 2020.