Sexual crimes, such as rape, sexual abuse, child molestation, and child sexual exploitation, are much more common in the United States than we would like admit. Reported sex crimes, which tend to be very few compared to the number of cases that have occurred, often result in severe punishment for the perpetrator. While in prison, these criminals do not cause any harm to the public; however, you can never be quite sure knowing that these criminals are roaming free after their time in prison is completed. Thanks to sources like familywatchdog.us and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Service website, the public has the ability to find and track convicted sex offenders after their release. With a few simple steps, anyone can gain full access to a sex offender's photograph, physical description, personal information, prior charges, current occupation, and address. Easy access to this information can provide a sense of comfort and security to the community; but how fair is this lack of privacy towards these criminals, who have already paid the price and are trying to put their crimes behind them? Under the laws of the United States Constitution, it must be argued that these registered offenders are unfairly given double punishment due to the total humiliation imposed upon them due to their apparent lack of privacy. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Released sex offenders were not exposed to lifelong shame and dishonor until the passage of a law in 1996, known as “Megan's Law.” In July 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was, as Bill Mears of CNN's Washington Bureau put it, "kidnapped, raped and murdered by a twice-convicted sex offender who lived across the street" (Mears, 2003). After this incident, Megan's Law was created which requires convicted sex offenders released from prison to register with local authorities, making it easier to track their whereabouts and make their personal information available to the community. There are many questions and concerns regarding the constitutionality of this law. Some of these issues were addressed in 2003, when the Supreme Court rejected challenges to sex offender notification laws in Alaska and Connecticut. The case Smith v Doe concerned sex offender registration laws in the state of Alaska. This case involved two men, Doe I and Doe II: one man was convicted of abusing his daughter, and the other was convicted of abusing a 14-year-old girl. Both men were released for their crimes in 1990, four years before any laws requiring sex offender registration went into effect. However, both of these men were forced to follow registration requirements once Megan's Law took effect, even after spending years out of prison rebuilding their new lives and regaining their reputations. Dana L. McDonald, in her article on Smith v Doe, stated: “In 1994, Doe I and Doe II, along with Doe I's wife, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska . They alleged that ASORA violated their procedural and substantive due process rights, their federal constitutional privacy rights, and the ex post facto clause” (McDonald, 370, 2004). These complaints, while reasonable, have notwas successful. According to Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times, "The court ruled by a 6-3 vote that Alaska could apply its law, which requires a registry of convicted sex offenders to be posted on the Internet, to those convicted before that the law came into force in 1994" (Serra, 2003). By 2003, all 50 states had adopted Megan's Law, which imposed registration requirements on tens of thousands of people whose original convictions did not impose such a requirement (Greenhouse, 2003). The main question encountered was whether or not this was a violation of the ex post facto clause of Article I of the Constitution. Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states: “No bill or law ex post facto shall be passed” (United States Constitution). An ex post facto law is one that inflicts punishment on a person for a previous act that was legal at the time the act was committed. Forcing tens of thousands of previous offenders to comply with this law, after having already served their sentences, is clear proof that the Constitution has been violated. This fact was negated by the claim that Alaska's sex offender registration law was normative. Because its goal was solely to protect the public, Alaska's law was considered non-punitive, not viewing sex offender registration requirements as a punishment meted out to the offender. In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argues, "the majority will never convince me that the registration and reporting requirements imposed on convicted sex offenders and on no one else as a result of their convictions are not part of their punishment" ( Stevens, 2003). Stevens not only realizes the injustice of these obligations, but, recognizing that only sex offenders and only sex offenders need to be registered, raises another argument in terms of this law: why sex offenders sex offenders are forced to register with the state when other dangerous criminals are not. Sex offenders released from prison are not only forced to commit their crime throughout their lives through a humiliating invasion of privacy, but they also receive an unfair disadvantage among the criminal population. Why should a man convicted of a minor sexual crime be considered more dangerous to society than a thief or murderer? This is just another factor that adds to the injustice of Megan's Law. Aside from the challenges faced by Alaska's sex offender registration law, Connecticut also faced challenges resulting from the passage of Megan's Law. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe was a Supreme Court case involving the claim that Connecticut's sex offender registration law violates the due process rights of convicted sex offenders by denying offenders a hearing to determine their level of threat to society. The Cornell University Law School website provides a summary of this case and states the following: Defendant, a convicted sex offender subject to the Act, brought a 42 USC §1983 action on behalf of himself and similarly sex offenders located, arguing that the law violates, among other things, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant, certified a class of individuals subject to the law, and permanently enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that such.