On the development of quantum computers and cryptography In 2010, the US government, after gaining access to files encrypted by physical intervention, exposed ten Russian sleeper agents; in 2013, the US government, without any means of physical intervention, surreptitiously collected and promptly decrypted many previously encrypted ones (Wood). Within this decade, concerns regarding the dubious security of contemporary cryptography will begin to emerge as the secrets of quantum computing are rapidly revealed. Companies that rely on Moore's Law, which states that computing power doubles every eighteen months, to justify using the theoretically weak encryption scheme known as RSA will succumb to the risks posed by unanticipated developments in this branch of computing. Such an event is not in the distant future, and when the stasis between the two opposing forces of cryptographic and quantum development breaks, it will disrupt all currently practiced cryptography techniques. To avoid the imminent risk of zero action, companies must invest in more reliable technologies. All electronic security in the modern world is based on a system developed before the advent of microprocessors known as "public key cryptography", which encrypts information with a lock that only the host can unlock using the so-called "public key". When it was first conceived in the 1940s, everyone praised the idea of ​​using inextricably convoluted code to obfuscate information. As a result, society built most of modern cryptography on this foundation. Seeking to improve this architecture in the 1970s, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman developed a new cryptographic scheme called "RSA" that works similarly... to the center of the card... the severity of an impending crisis and possibly spread it completely. As the future arrives quickly and quantum computing technology develops at an unprecedented pace, the development of a complete, fully functional quantum computer will bring both luxuries and risks to the world. Even so, quantum computers do not hide dangers in and of themselves: only people who find it useful to abuse them hide dangers. Individuals and politicians cannot avoid this by condemning the use and development of this technology. By investing in other encryption technologies, companies can protect their digital assets from brute force attacks. At a time when the government is already putting cybersecurity at stake, progress remains the only conceivable option. For better or for worse, the computing power that the government has today will be available to the people tomorrow.